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The Tasmanian state–local partnership agreements program, instituted in 1998 by the
late Premier Jim Bacon, is proving an innovation in the reorientation of inter-governmental
affairs. The partnerships established thus far have totally transformed state-local
relations. Indeed the program has been so successfully implemented that it is now
impossible to imagine local governance in the state functioning without it. However this
paper is concerned with partnerships in broader than functional terms. It is concerned
with formative concepts, such as strengthened community, local sustainability and
enhanced democracy, and whether these are being advanced by the partnership
experience. It is not hard to judge the partnership program an innovation in the
administrative and functional sense, for embedding the systematic networking of
institutional relations for example. However this paper argues for evaluation against more
complex criteria. The failed emphasis upon participatory governance in particular shows
that the Tasmanian program cannot be judged a success against the partnership notion
when it is more broadly defined. The paper identifies and interrogates a form–function
dilemma in the partnership experience and provides a discursive account of, and
refection upon, the Tasmanian context. It finds that thus far the emphasis has been upon
improved process design rather than upon exploiting the partnership program as a
means of promoting more ‘formative’ aspirations.
The Tasmanian state-local partnership program was a product of the need to better manage
state-local relations in the context of attempting to reduce the number of local councils. It
was born of the attempt to resolve the impasse that the State Liberal minority government,
supported in office by the Tasmanian Greens, had reached in proposing to amalgamate 29
local councils to half that number. The parochial public and political backlash to
amalgamation was immense, sustained and powerful, with the proposal ultimately thwarted
by a successful challenge in the Supreme Court (Haward and Zwart 1999). The Labor Party
needed to have an alternative to forced amalgamations going into the 1998 state election
campaign after the Liberal Government fell in contentious circumstances, including its
attempts to reform local government and to sell off the State's hydro-electricity assets.
Labor was elected in 1998 partly on the basis that no forced amalgamations would take
place, but that a partnership approach would instead underpin improved efficiencies and
improved relations between levels of government. Rather than forcing amalgamations then,
the Labor government, led by the late Premier Jim Bacon, embarked upon a lengthy and
ambitious process of establishing an entirely new partnership program. This program now
facilitates innovative and revitalised state-local institutional relations, featuring joined up
rather than amalgamated local government (Downe and Martin 2006), that have not been
replicated anywhere else in Australia.
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As well as the concern with streamlining the operation of so many councils for such a small
state, there were also concerns about local decline, long term sustainability, limited
resources, and possible ways forward. Whilst it is following the global trend of concern for
local revival (see Mazmanian and Kraft 1999; Taylor 2003), the Tasmanian program is
nevertheless distinct for effectively being an institutional arrangement of the State between
its sub-national and local levels. Local revival, indeed survival, is therefore a matter for formal
rather than informal or community based structures. And since its establishment a decade
ago, the program has evolved to embrace broader definitions of partnerships with the
accommodation of regional and state based issues, as we shall see. With many of the
councils in the process of renegotiating their initial partnerships, which expire after a three
year period, it is now timely to cast a critical eye over this experience. In this paper I argue
that the program is serving its function as a tool for clarifying and improving inter-
governmental relations to an outstanding degree, but that the progress of its formative role
in advancing social, economic and environmental priorities (Considine 2005: 11) is less
convincing. Greater potential impact for the program remains, it is suggested, in the
domains of community strengthening and local sustainability, with enhanced, indeed thus far
unrealised, public participation as critical to achieving more complex goals.
The paper makes further observations about the partnership program in terms of network
governance, at least in the institutional sense. The program certainly represents an institutional
innovation in network governance terms by joining up state and local government in a way that
has fostered collaborative advantage for both. It has also achieved the network governance aim
of creating new opportunities for decision-making and local institution building, and in this sense
has fostered a new interdependence and set of working relations between public actors (Edgar
2002). And the achievements of the program do echo those intended by network governance.
The program promotes flexibility to local conditions, reduces costs by fostering local-to-local
resource sharing, and overcomes fragmented arrangements for service delivery (Considine
2005: 13). What the program has not achieved so far, however, is the network governance aim
of increased legitimacy through increased public participation in decision–making. The program
is functioning well, then, but in the sense of servicing and enhancing inter-governmental relations
rather than of promoting more general participatory governance. The program does directly
influence both local politics and collaborative policy outcomes, but to this point without
promoting the 'deepening democratic engagement' that is often seen as a core principle of
network governance efforts.
The paper reviews international literature to firstly identify what it terms the ‘form–function
dilemma’ in the partnership experience, or the tension between the formative aspirations that
motivate partnerships, and the functional operations by which they are pursued. Whilst the
Tasmanian experience is essentially a functional arrangement between levels of government,
the paper identifies what it argues are unrealised aspirations that resonate more broadly and
that are underpinned by public participation and power sharing in the partnership
experience. Democracy is identified as a key formative aspiration of the partnership
endeavour, which is readily constrained, as the international literature shows, by too great an
efficiency emphasis. The network governance literature also captures the form–function
dilemma, with efforts to promote community development in constant tension with efforts to
inspire lasting institutional design and change. This dilemma is examined in Tasmania
following a descriptive accounting of its state-local partnership program, which captures the
embedding and implementation of its institutional design. This is the first paper to document
the Tasmanian program, and it is limited by its descriptive focus, which is critical, however,
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to its identification of form–function tensions, the criteria for which are drawn from policy
literature that has burgeoned over the last two decades.
The Form–Function Dilemma
The term ‘partnership’ has been used for many years in numerous contexts. It has both
positive and negative connotations, and ranges broadly in scope and type, with two or more
partners generally working towards mutually agreed goals in an interdependent manner.
Some see partnerships as public policy cure–alls, whilst others see them as over used,
ambiguous and politicised - posing messy solutions to very messy problems (Cook 2000;
Geddes 2006; Hastings 1996; Lowndes et al 1997). They belong to the practice of new
governance whereby political influence has proliferated and administrative partners have
multiplied way beyond the formal circle of traditional government (Bingham and Nabatchi
2005; Crowley and Coffey 2007). Partnerships vary in type from public–private to
inter–governmental and collaborative, and are not static experiences or practices, but may
evolve or vary from issue specific, ad hoc responses, to more general attempts at problem
solving (Kernaghan 1993). However, key partnership features include: power; participation;
formality; flexibility; collaboration and cooperation; self-reliance; synergy; goals; strategies
and local transformation. Kernaghan argues that a true partnership will be recognisable for
always promoting empowerment by sharing decision making. The term is used here in his
sense of 'a formal agreement to share power with others in the pursuit of joint goals and/or
mutual benefits' (Kernaghan 1993: 57–61; see also Davies 2002: 191).
In terms of this paper, the focus is on inter-governmental partnerships, and the potential for
enhanced public participation and power sharing to underpin strategic state-local planning
for social, economic and environmental outcomes. The dilemma raised is between the
formative and functional roles of inter-governmental partnerships, with the argument being
made that public participation is a key to both community strengthening and local
sustainability. Considine (2004) describes the key dimensions of community strengthening
as increased connectedness and shared leadership, with new governance institutions as
facilitative bodies and partnerships that are truly inclusive. Prugh et al also stress inclusivity,
by arguing that an engaged citizenry will correlate strongly with effective government
responses to issues of sustainability. Indeed the environmental partnership experience offers
a wealth of experience in collaborative planning that can be seen as both empowering of
communities, and inspiring of transformative change (Prugh et al 2000: 129). Whilst these
and other partnerships have their problems, it is rare that their critics recommend curtailed
public participation as the remedy; indeed Radin (1996) recommends the opposite.
Table 1: Intergovernmental partnerships, community strengthening and local
sustainability — Key Features
Intergovernmental Partnership Community Strengthening Local Sustainability
rejection of one size fits all increased connectedness engaged citizenry
multiple policy partners shared leadership collaborative planning
collaboration between partners new governance institutions science and culture interaction
broad based participation partnerships that are inclusive community empowerment
(Radin 1996) (Considine 2004) (Prugh et al 2000).
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1 Intergovernmental Performance partnerships with States-Localities, Strengthening the Partnership in
Intergovernmental Service Delivery, www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-
people/199402/msg00174.html
Kernaghan (1993: 57) prefers to see the formative and functional roles of partnerships not as
competing notions, but as features that constitute the dual purpose of the partnership
experience. Democracy in his terms is then a formative aspect of partnerships (i.e.,
empowering individuals, groups and organisations outside government by enabling them to
make a genuine contribution to government decisions that affect them). And efficiency is a
functional aspect (i.e., improving the effectiveness and the responsiveness of public
organisations). Nevertheless, he concedes that these two roles can and have generated
tension at the local level. Hendriks and Tops (1999) illustrate this with their findings that local
government reform has inspired contradictory trends in two countries — towards democracy
in the Netherlands, but towards efficiency in Germany. They explain that, whilst the
Netherlands discovered new public management as a reform tool relatively early, by the
1990s it was moving back away from efficiency rationales towards the rationale of the citizen.
The opposite has been true in Germany, where the much later adoption of new public
management as a reform tool has recast the citizen at the local level from collaborator to
consumer. Hendriks and Tops argue that, because the Netherlands experienced and
responded to its financial crisis earlier than Germany, it was then better placed to
democratise local decision making at a time of decreased pressure for efficiency (Hendriks
and Tops 1999: 146).
If we look to the United States, we can see that the partnerships that occurred in the 1980s were
primarily driven by the ‘Reaganomics’ paradigm of economic scarcity and government desire to
find more efficient and effective ways of using resources. Partnerships with business, community
organisations and between levels of government were, and often still are, merely intended to
avoid duplication of effort, and to share resources1 (see also Mowbray 2005). These are much
like service agreements. However, they may be intended, as the Oregon Option (SOO 2002) has
been, to also foster more state or local fiscal autonomy, albeit in the context of the
federal–state–local governments working together to test service delivery based upon
measureable results. The Oregon Option, which was established at Oregon's initiative, may well
have been inspired by the public–private partnerships for urban renewal that followed the
partnership based decentralisation and deregulation of the Reagan administration. Closer to the
Tasmanian experience are the US National Rural Development Partnerships that evolved from
these earlier efforts and that reject a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to economic development, and
seek local solutions instead facilitated by inter–governmental cooperation. Distinguishing
features of the Rural Development partnership include collaboration, broad based participation,
iteration and reliance upon multiple policy partners for policy development and implementation
(Radin 1996; Table 1).
The UK Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP) bring together public, private, community and
voluntary sector organisations, with the intention of securing synergistic working
relationships on ‘wicked issues’ such as health, education, community safety and so on.
They may or may not be initiated by local authorities, and were preceded by periods of local
authority–led renewal, and public–private renewal. In general terms, LSPs aim to improve
the quality of life, by working collaboratively, sustaining growth and improving service delivery
(Lowndes et al 1997; Smith and Beazley 2000). These sorts of local partnerships reflect
social and economic, if not always environmental, concerns, and have inspired community
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trust, participation and gains, to varying degrees, in practice (Geddes 2006). They have
become so prevalent that they have long been recognised by the OECD as being at the core
of a new localism in regional communities that have been devastated by long term
unemployment and general decline (Sabel 1996; DoE 1996). Partnership in this sense
encourages social innovation as well as the allocation of scare fiscal resources, and uses
flexibility, synergy and participation as community revival and survival tools. The LSP process
and experience is theoretically about localisation and shared responsibility, and is an
acknowledged — if fraught and contested — means of enhancing the legitimacy of local
governance in practice (Geddes 2006; Mullally 1998). In the case of LSPs, Geddes observes
that despite their renewal and efficiency emphasis, and their facilitation of enhanced community
participation, there have been few measurable policy outcomes that have demonstrated the
value of partnership working over the ten years of the program (Geddes 2006).
The findings of Hendriks and Tops suggest in particular, that form may well follow function in
local partnerships. In other words, having first achieved local government efficiencies, local
partnerships may then be better placed to pursue enhanced local democratic opportunities.
This is seemly borne out by the experience in the United States at least, where partnerships
concerned initially with fiscal efficiency and policy performance or results–based governance,
have then been followed by partnerships concerned with collaborative efforts to achieve local
participation and local priorities. In the UK, however, experience suggests that partnerships
may simply proliferate broadly, as they have for example in Scotland (McArthur 1995), as well
as evolve in type from public–private to local community arrangements rather than pursue
any rational form to function pathway. Power sharing and devolution in these latter
arrangements have also proven to be no guarantee of success in either community
regeneration or local sustainability. Nevin and Shiner (1995: 313) also suggest that form
follows function by observing that local empowerment fails where it has not been developed
in the enabling context of a strong, principled state and a relevant planning framework. This
sort of enabling framework may be exactly what an effective, institutionally embedded inter-
governmental arrangement such as the Tasmanian partnership program may provide as a
first step to then promoting broader goals and benefits.
The form–function partnership tension is certainly recognisable in the network governance
literature, in terms of the efforts it captures to promote community development on one hand
and to inspire institutional design on the other. There is in Tasmania a direct link — identified
as desirable by theorists — between efforts to generate improvements in local economic
development and the new forms of governance that have emerged in order to support it
(Considine 2005: 16). The key to generating capacity to govern locally, in the absence of
local government amalgamations as a type of enforced resource sharing, has been the
evolution of the partnership program and the networking and regional planning it has
inspired. The functional aspects of network governance are certainly highly recognisable in
the Tasmanian program. Tasmanian partnerships are innovative institutional arrangements;
have joined up and created new interdependencies between levels of government; and have
tackled problems in a multi–dimensional and locally flexible way (Considine 2005:3). The
parties to the partnerships are indeed locked into joint mandates and resource dependencies
that function as governance ‘service networks’ where the state delivers to the client or
customer in this case the local or regional community (Considine 2005: 6; 9). However, the
Tasmanian partnerships also demonstrate how well, or to borrow Kernaghan's term, how
‘efficiently’ such governance arrangements can function in the absence of any great concern
for democracy.
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2 Forced amalgamations, the alternative to partnerships that was being considered initially in Tasmania, are being
planned for in Queensland driven by efficiency concerns. Dollery (2007), however, argues that there are no
grounds for suggesting that bigger councils are any more financially sustainable over time than smaller ones.
3 Partnership agreements do not create new funds. They are negotiated within the framework of existing budgets.
Tasmanian State–Local Partnerships
Despite having none but delegated legislative and fiscal authority, local government in
Australia has increasingly seen itself less as a creature of the state and more as a partner in
the act of governance (Chapman 1997). Historically, the notion of local governments as
partners has referred to the Commonwealth’s attempts to by-pass the States in
implementing policy (Chapman 1997: 3). In Tasmania today however, the notion of ‘local
partnership’ is much changed and refers to state initiated agreements with local
governments on policy priorities and local development in a strategic, state planning context.
This arrangement is closer to the rural partnerships in the United States than the local
partnerships in the United Kingdom. However, all these partnerships, Tasmania's included,
are concerned with local resilience and renewal. Tasmania has been at the forefront of the
Australian States in terms of negotiating state–local partnership agreements with its 29 local
councils. Whilst New South Wales has expressed interest in Tasmania's program and
Victoria has established issue specific partnerships, South Australia appears most likely to
follow Tasmania's lead at this stage (Meiklejohn and Barnard 2004: 38–9).2
The Tasmanian program was an initiative of the late Tasmanian Premier, Jim Bacon, who was
also Minister for Local Government. It had its genesis in the view that committed,
progressive, local communities and sound local economies are fundamental to the social
and economic development of the State. Establishing strong links to community priorities
was considered an essential aim (Stevens 2000:1). For the Premier, the partnership program
was about formalising the relationship between the two levels of government, putting these
relations on a positive basis, and establishing formal processes to work through state–local
government issues (Hansard, Tuesday 19th October, 1999). It was also intended to reverse
the trend throughout Australia of stripping local communities of their input into decision
making (Hansard, Tuesday 13th April, 1999) and to find local solutions to local problems. The
program is intended to serve several purposes. It strives for genuine cooperative working
relationships, improved efficiency, mutually determined funding allocation and enhanced
local service delivery. The aim is to generate new opportunities for local growth and
development within the context of Tasmania Together, the State's community generated a
20–year social, environmental and economic plan (CLG 2000).
Premier Bacon conceived of the idea for the partnership program from a Nixon Report
recommendation that service arrangements needed to be agreed at least between the two
island councils and the state government (Nixon 1997: 71). The Premier described the fact
that this logic could apply to the whole State as an alternative to amalgamations as
‘irresistible’ (Hansard, Wednesday 17th March 1999). Also attributable to ‘irresistible logic’
was the need to integrate the program with a new state planning agenda, also introduced
by Labor, with partnership agreements then integral to implementing the benchmarks set by
this process. Because financial aspects attach to partnership agreements, the then
Tasmanian Treasurer David Crean declared the partnership program ‘a cornerstone of
Tasmania's Industry Development Plan’ [Wed 6 June 2001 Estimates Committee A (Crean)
Part 3].3 The partnership program is thus not only an attempt by an incoming state
government to move beyond a period of poor inter–governmental relations, but also an act
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4 Available at: http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/lgo/partnerships/publications.html.
5 Altered by the current Premier Paul Lennon to Minister Assisting the Premier on Local Government.
of integrated governance that has contributed to the development of a strategic context for
policy in Tasmania. State planning; partnerships with local councils and regional bodies; links
to industry policy; and industry councils thus comprise a newly established meta–policy
context for the state.
The partnership program was launched in 1998. The first agreement between the State and
the north–west coast's Circular Head Council was signed in June 1999. There are currently
28 bilateral state–local agreements, three regional agreements covering the entire State and
every council, and four state–wide issue based agreements. The state–wide agreements
with all councils include the ‘simplifying planning’, ‘waste management’, ‘financial reform’
and ‘communication and consultation’ agreements, with an agreement also for the benefit
of young Tasmanians. Also recently signed is a tripartite Partnership Agreement for
Population and Ageing between commonwealth, state and local governments, the only one
of its kind in the country. A partnership expires after three years and then lapses, so that
currently, seventeen councils and three regions are negotiating second agreements. The
partnership program also embraces two broader agreements on respectively the Derwent
River's Estuary management, and sustainable tourism in Southern Tasmania. There are
partnership agreements more generally, with the University of Tasmania; Volunteering
Australia; the Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and a memorandum of
understanding on employment with the Commonwealth. The Tasmania Together Progress
Board — an independent statutory authority — has itself also struck partnership agreements
with a broad range of government, non–government and community bodies on the
implementation of its 20–year social, environmental and economic plan.
It is worth noting that the partnership program has been an institution building exercise,
including the establishment of the Premier’s Local Government Council that meets
bi–annually. This is chaired by the Premier and comprises the nine elected representatives
on the General Management Committee for the Local Government Association of Tasmania.
The Council is supported by an official's committee, which is comprised of representatives
from the State, local councils and the Local Government Association of Tasmania. Different
negotiating teams are involved with each partnership agreement, led by a different state head
of agency each time, and comprising only the numbers required to facilitate an agreement.
There is a protocol arrangement to be followed in negotiating a partnership and in its
implementation and reporting phases.4 The program is supported by the Local Government
Office, which is located within the Department of Premier and Cabinet. It was initially strongly
supported politically by Premier Bacon as Minister for Local Government5 and by a
Parliamentary Secretary for Local Government. A critical feature of the program has been
the linking–up of state and local officials during the partnership negotiation, implementation,
monitoring and reporting stages. Over 600 officials are believed to be involved in well-
established relations between the state and local spheres that were previously unknown. An
electronic implementation data-base has also been established by the Local Government
Division to facilitate reporting and evaluation of the program (LGD 2004). Partnership
implementation schedules are managed through this.
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6 Available at: ttp://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/lgo/partnerships/processdocs/
PA_Process_Flowchart_Sep07.pdf.
The partnership program is a very new way for the State and local councils to work together
for the benefit of local communities — at an earlier than normal stage of policy development
and in a way that is not legislatively driven (Garcia 2000: 4). All agreements are voluntary and
initiated when a council writes to the Premier with a view to begin negotiating. Council and
Cabinet then sign each agreement, and each sets out negotiated actions and timeframes for
social, environmental, economic outcomes, based upon a consistent set of principles.
These comprise:
1. A reflection of the State’s desire for improved cooperation between state and local
government in Tasmania.
2. The State retaining responsibility for services that require uniform standards or
consistency, and those relating to state-wide economic development and social
issues.
3. Changes in responsibilities to achieve overall efficiency across both spheres of
government.
4. Initiatives to see that Partnership Agreement results are measurable by performance
indicators. Performance Agreements provide for the development and
implementation of performance indicators, particularly in relation to financial
management and service delivery, and to monitor any anticipated partnership
benefits.6
5. Provision of an annual report to State Parliament on the progress of the
implementation of agreements, and notification of the achievements of outcomes in
key areas such as economic development, tourism, recreation and so forth (LGO
2006).
The Tasmanian partnership program does represent an entirely new, collaborative approach
to inter–governmental relations, with greater community renewal and sustainability potential
than perhaps it aspires to or is credited for. Clearly the program has brought local
government into play as a key strategic governance partner. Local councils and their officials
have certainly gained bargaining power and an institutionalised forum for direct negotiation
with the State on community affairs, but the input of the community is less assured.
Partnerships are expected to reflect the strategic plans of local councils and these are
assumed to have had public input, although this is most often at best by way of submissions
on draft plans. Nevertheless government rhetoric is strongly supportive of the partnerships
as vehicles for community views and priorities, with a critical feature of the program being
that the Premier’s Local Government Council may itself seek local input. The program does
involve power sharing between levels of government, bone fide participation by councils in
setting their own agendas and both a formality and flexibility in negotiating arrangements. It
is thus far less obvious that the effect of the program is increased community self-reliance
achieved through a creative harnessing of collaborative efforts for local transformation. This
raises the issue, however, of how the program is to achieve its social, economic and
environmental goals over the long term without explicitly designing these goals into both the
program and its evaluation processes.
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7 The partnerships are intended to “provide the state government (sic.) with a structured way of talking to local
government. They also reflect the increasing complexity of local government as it expands its responsibilities
towards the broader social mix of community democracy” (Scott 2002: 2).
Evaluating Partnership Practice
The evaluation of the Tasmanian partnership program is a very simple task in the sense of
evaluating how it is functioning, but a very complex one, in the sense of evaluating what it is
achieving for local communities in terms of social, economic and environmental their goals.
If we firstly consider the functional context, we see that the Tasmanian partnerships are true
inter-governmental partnerships in Armstrong and Lenihan's (1999) sense of being
agreements that are collaboratively designed and delivered, with shared decision making,
risk and gains. In terms of network governance they create new pathways between public
actors for collaborative decision making on community development and service delivery for
example (Considine 2005). They are also pragmatic arrangements that reject the one size
fits all approach to state-local affairs, as do the US National Rural Development and the UK
Local Strategic Partnerships. Every partnership follows an agreed process with different
outcomes, and indeed different types of partnerships have evolved to meet different
'connected' needs between councils, in regions and across the state. These are robust
arrangements in Considine's (2004) sense of what is required to establish governance
arrangements for state–local collaboration. In fact they are flexible for creating opportunities for
aspects of each of the three ‘decentralised’, ‘joint’ or ‘devolved’ local governance styles. But
the Tasmanian program does not provide for institutionalised citizen participation, nor for the
explicit inclusion of non-government stakeholders. This participation may eventually occur,
however, first, because it has a pattern of occurring elsewhere and second, because there is a
strong platform for such a move, and lastly because such participation was always intended.7
The lack of institutionalised citizen participation does not mean that the partnership program
lacks accountability in other more functional ways however. Indeed, with the exception of
the manner in which negotiation is struck, the process is open and transparent, well
supported by web based resources, material, reports and agreement details that are open
to the public. Again in terms of the program’s functional context, annual reporting of
partnership progress is both comprehensively done to State Parliament and
specificallyrecorded by local councils for constituencies in their own annual reports. These
are compiled in part from tri-annual reports to the Premier, Cabinet, State Parliament,
mayors, local councils and regional bodies. Tracking of progress on the agreements is
achieved via an implementation matrix that notes agreed actions, lead and other agencies,
action officers, milestones, progress to milestones and links to the benchmarks in the
Tasmanian Together plan. Evaluation takes place one year after signing and at the expiry of
a partnership. It is possible by looking at it’s annual report to State Parliament to see what
each partnership has achieved for the year with respect to the detail of projects, and in terms
of a relatively simplified statistical analysis. For example, the progress summary of key
outputs in 2006 showed for each Council: i) progress within and outside of agreed
timeframes; ii) progress on hold; and iii) recommendations to discontinue progress. There is
no longer an aggregated figure for each of these types for the entire program, but only figures
for each agreement.
Whilst the progress summary of key outputs is a logical reporting measure for the functional
operation of the Tasmanian partnerships, it is not complemented by any broader evaluative
tools that attempt to measure progress type, for example, social, economic or environmental
55028 Public Policy Text-1:50993 Public Policy Text  27/8/08  4:20 PM  Page 25
FORM–FUNCTION DILEMMAS IN TASMANIAN STATE–LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS
26
impact. Neither is there a reporting linkage to existing state-wide tools used to determine
these impacts, i.e., the Tasmania Together benchmarking and the Measuring Council
Performance processes. Furthermore, there are no differentiated evaluative techniques
specific to each different type of partnership, nor any focus upon outcomes other than
implementation timelines. There is in effect an ‘instrumental-managerial’ (Sanderson 2001)
focus on performance management to the detriment of the development of other evaluative
styles. This focus on ‘process outcomes’ is at the expense of focus on ‘progress outcomes’
and has typified reporting on the UK’s LSP program (Geddes 2006: 13). All that can be
gleaned from the Tasmanian reporting is a scorecard on the number of partnership initiatives
that have been completed or not, that have progressed in a timely fashion or not, and that
have been extended or discontinued. The opportunity is lost then to pursue formative
aspirations (i.e., those beyond the functional) of the partnership program through purpose
designed evaluation and evaluative techniques. Whilst an assessment of process outcomes
shows that the Tasmanian program is well embedded and operational, an assessment of
progress outcome points to the limitations of failing to extensively involve local communities.
It could be argued the Tasmanian program does not need extensive community involvement
to identify social, economic and environmental goals since it is linked to the Tasmania
Together plan which was itself derived from extensive community consultation (Crowley and
Coffey 2007). And indeed, it is a part of the formal sign-off procedures, if not the public
reporting procedures, for the parties to relate partnership goals to the community priorities
identified in the plan. However, Tasmania Together goals and benchmarks are necessarily
generic, and they do require local interpretation by local communities and benchmarking by
local authorities, something that should logically become part of the partnership process.
These local communities are also currently assumed by the partnership process to have
driven local council agendas and plans to an unrealistic degree, and it may be that an
amendment of local government legislation could mandate bone fide deliberative and
consultative processes. As the literature above suggests, the lack of community
participation is seriously deficient. Broad-based participation, inclusiveness and community
empowerment are key defining features of the objectives of intergovernmental partnerships,
community strengthening and local sustainability as we have seen (as in Table 1). Tasmania
does have an advantage if it does decide to pursue enhanced participation at the local level,
however, for at least having in place an enabling policy context with its existing, well
functioning partnership program.
There are at least two ways in which broad-based community participation could to be
introduced into the Tasmanian partnerships process. First, through the local council strategic
planning process, and second, by amending partnership protocol to require public input. In
terms of the planning process, explicit clauses requiring public participation could be
strengthened in the Local Government Act, covering the public's role in local planning, local
partnerships and perhaps even issue specific local and regional deliberative forums. Local
councils could borrow from the extensive public consultative techniques employed in the
development of the Tasmania Together plan which were inspired in part by the Glenorchy
City Council's community consultation techniques. Similarly, partnership protocol could
require that community forums be run from an early stage in the process to help determine
what is put on the table. Community negotiators could also work in issue groups along side
local government, business and state government negotiators. Public participation could be
required before any partnership agreement was signed, and a reporting of its perceived
results could be required before any was renegotiated. Issue–based evaluation could also
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drive enhanced participation, by surveying the contents of partnership schedules to see
which actions were promoting community, sustainability or a more participatory community.
The picture that would begin to emerge from this kind of broader evaluation would be one
that shows how formative aspirations are tracking at the local level, to complement the
accountability based evaluation of the functional effectiveness of programs.
This paper has argued that there is a form–function dilemma or tension in the partnership
experience between broad ‘formative’ aspirations, such as community empowerment,
revival and survival, and more narrow functional considerations, such as efficiency and
resource sharing. Much of the international literature illustrates the disconnect between
formative partnership aspirations and outcomes such as improved citizen engagement,
quality of life, and environmental sustainability. Neville and Shiner (1995) argue that the
haphazard forming of partnerships contributes to this disconnect and that the embedding of
effective partnership practice is better facilitated by systematic, deliberate state effort. The
Tasmanian partnership experience shows, however, that there is a risk that the creation of
direct and efficient pathways between state and local government actors may offer no
incentives for involving the community. In this case, innovative institutional design which is
the product of systematic, deliberate state efforts may in fact introduce new rigidities rather
than ending old rigidities, as we would expect say from introducing networked governance
(Considine 2005). On the other hand, this may simply show that the Tasmanian program can
only be defined as network governance in its most narrow, limited, sense of
intergovernmental service agreements. It is worth reflecting on network governance theory,
and the Tasmanian partnership practice, therefore, before considering remedies to the
program's democratic deficits in this paper's conclusions.
Conclusions
If we return to Kernaghan's analytic lenses of efficiency and democracy, we can see that
efficiency reflects the functional aspects of partnership arrangements, and democracy, the
more formative, or aspirational rather than directional aspects. There is a strong correlation
between the emphasis in network governance literature on issues of mechanics — the
functional processes of joining up, interacting, collaborating and working in multiple
dimensions — and the Tasmanian experience. Just as the network governance literature
suggests, the Tasmanian experience has been one of the new forms of decision making, in
the sense of new place–based institution building, focusing on local problem solving, and
partnering to create robust networks. The partnership experience has been one of linking
small, parochial local councils that have found their capacity to govern increasingly shrinking,
with other councils, regional bodies, issue arenas, the state government and its officials. The
partnership program resonates therefore with the functional aspects of network governance,
particularly in the sense of more effective and better negotiated service delivery. It resonates
less so with network governance more broadly defined and falls well short of Considine's
‘authentic, interactive localism’, with enhanced opportunity for citizen involvement in decision
making a notable road not taken. Neither is the Tasmanian experience network governance
that is driven by its own dynamics, rather it is the creature of state control, with asymmetrical
power relations a key defining feature.
So in conclusion, it is clear that the Tasmanian partnership program is functioning efficiently,
but that its capacity could be expanded through more explicit community strengthening and
sustainability planning — facilitated by more consultative and deliberative practices. The
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partnership program would then be better placed to achieve its objectives of progressing
agreed social, economic and environmental priorities. The program is a highly functional,
efficient mechanism for managing state-local relations, and for negotiating joint goals,
resources, and strategic priorities. It is also iterative — evolving with the emergence of issue
based state-wide and tri-partite partnerships that have become very effective governance
tools. However, the program is arguably narrowly conceived despite its underpinning by
social, economic and environmental rhetoric, and is further narrowly evaluated in terms of
agreed schedules, and lists of agreed measures, discontinued measures and future
measures. With the process now so administratively embedded, both narrow conception
and narrow evaluation could be reconsidered. Having first achieved local government
efficiencies, local partnerships are now well placed to pursue enhanced local democratic
opportunities. In effect, the original conception of service agreements with island councils is
now simply writ large and the State is yet to lift its aspirations, to achieve truly participatory
governance, reach for sustainability, and achieve long term local revival.
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